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1. Introduction 
William Kent's Data and Reality, originally published in 1978, is a classic text on conceptual 
modeling. It is painful, but surely the least damaging for me to do so right away, to admit that I 
only read his insightful, important book in the middle of the year 2002. What kept me? Over 
the years, of course I have frequently seen it referenced to. Yet, no author I have consulted so 
far has written so enthusiastically about Kent's work as to persuade me that reading Data and 
Reality was absolutely necessary. So I didn't rush out to a library. Or borrow it from a friend, 
colleague, or whomever. Still my interest was sufficiently stimulated that I did try to purchase a 
copy. For then I could just leave it, I thought, to pick it up when I really felt like studying it. 
However, getting my hands on a copy was not at all easy. For a long time, a new copy was out 
of the question, anyway. I guess the same lack of endorsement that kept me from rushing to 
read it has caused the publisher to keep the book out of print. Curiously enough, even with the 
Internet and all, it appeared equally impossible to acquire a second-hand copy. Owners 
apparently value their possession and don't want to part with it. Luckily, Data and Reality has 
recently become available again 'as new.' It is distributed on an order-per-copy basis, 
electronically and on paper. Soon after receiving my paper copy I started to read it. And then I 
didn't put it down until I was finished. Especially considering they were written almost 25 years 
ago, today Kent's ideas are also amazingly productive. 
I don't intend to review Data and Reality in the sense of presenting a summary. I urge 
everyone to read Kent's book for her- or himself. What I want to do is discuss assumptions. 
Kent definitely offers far-reaching proposals for conceptual modeling. However, what also 
makes his book a 'classic' is that several assumptions can be recognized as limiting for future 
information services. That is, he doesn't go far enough. I will try to point such assumptions out 
from the perspective of my own recent work on conceptual modeling (for example, Wisse 
2001/a, 2002). This perspective makes it equally clear that Kent, in fact, already held a strong 
intuition about further developments in conceptual modeling. 
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2. Logical atomism 
I believe Kent first and foremost tried to write a book for practical use. Quite rightly, he 
emphasizes the need for conceptual modeling as a separate "level of description." Seen in this 
light, Data and Reality is a collection of everyday conceptual pitfalls with solutions 
practitioners can apply to avoid them. As such, it still is extremely valuable. There is a problem, 
though. I take it Kent was writing for an audience of information system practitioners, rather 
than academics, and that he therefore refrains from an in-depth treatment of ontological issues. 
However, it is in the nature of conceptual modeling that sooner or later ontology is what it is 
'really' all about. 
As Kent doesn't systematically explain his view of reality (also read: ontology or metaphysics), 
it needs to be reconstructed. My impression is that, anyway for the purpose of conceptual 
modeling, he is actually still more in search for an ontology than reasoning from assumptions 
held with conviction. The area of his search is clearly visible from the perspective of so-called 
logical atomism. Before I make my case for this interpretation, let me first briefly discuss 
logical atomism itself. 
An obvious place to look is Bertrand Russell's essay 'Logical Atomism' (1924). In fact, Russell 
starts by emphasizing — what he wants the reader to accept as — his priority: 
I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be 
characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic[.] 
Another painful admission I have to make is that, from his essay, I couldn't really get a clear 
idea of Russell's logical atomism. I believe he is especially arguing about how to arrange a 
scientific discipline as a deductive system. Such a system is 
the set of all those propositions that can be deduced from an assigned set of premises[.] 
And those premises, or 
first principles[, ...] are to be believed, not on their own account, but on account of their 
consequences. The epistemological question: "Why should I believe this set of 
propositions?" is quite different from the logical question "What is the smallest and 
logically simplest group of propositions from which this set of propositions can be 
deduced?" 
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Russell adds that 
errors are liable to arise from assimilating the logical to the epistemological order[.] 
I suppose Russell considers logical atomism his doctrine of logical order. Then, for a 
productive logical order, 
substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities. 
I won't pretend to grasp his maxim. What I faintly seem to recognize, from a deconstruction 
perspective, is that Russell means that in logic "known entities" ultimately are reducible to 
logical atoms. But what are his — types of — logical atoms? 
I have been speaking hitherto of what it is not necessary to assume as part of the 
ultimate constituents of the world. But logical constructions, like all other constructions, 
require materials, and it is time to turn to the positive question, as to what these 
materials are to be. This question, however, requires as a preliminary a discussion of 
logic and language and their relation to what they try to represent. 
How is this to be taken? "Logic and language" now seem to acquire an instrumental character. 
Isn't Russell, after all, claiming priority for reality, i.e., for what is represented? Shouldn't 
philosophy always involve metaphysical inquiry, too? What 'type' of philosophy is Russell 
addressing? He writes: 
The influence of language on philosophy has, I believe, been profound and almost 
unrecognized. If we are not to be misled by this influence, it is necessary to become 
conscious of it, and to ask ourselves deliberately how far it is legitimate. 
Despite several pages on — what I read as — the relationship between logic and language, 
Russell unerringly moves into the direction of ontological statements. 
I confess it seems obvious to me [...] that what is complex must be composed of simples, 
though the number of constituents may be infinite. 
Why doesn't he use the word 'atom'? I can still only recognize that Russell's logical atomism is 
constructed from an ontological or metaphysical atomism. He consistently tries to return to a 
philosophy-as-logic but never escapes ontological issues. Another example is: 
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In addition that we do not experience simples as such, there is another obstacle to the 
actual creation of a correct logical language[.] 
What, then, would count as correct? Is it a one-to-one correspondence between "simple" and 
"word"? 
This obstacle is vagueness. All our words are more or less infected with vagueness, by 
which I mean that it is not always clear whether they apply to a given object or not. It is 
of the nature of words to be more or less general, and not to apply to only a single 
particular[. ...] The defect, however, is one which it is easy to imagine removed, 
however difficult it may be to remove it in fact. 
Once again, such a passage confirms Russell's view of "an ideal logical language." He of course 
assumes reality. However, from the particular perspective of — his idea of — logic Russell 
argues that he cannot decide on one ontology or another. I believe it is the other way around. 
His assumptions include a particular structure of reality. It is precisely such a structure built 
from 'real' atoms that underlies his logical atomism. Still clinging to an appearance of 
philosophical priority for logic, he tentatively presents his worldview (also read: ontology or 
metaphysics): 
I suggest the following as an outline of a possible structure of the world; it is no more 
than an outline, and it is not offered as more than possible. 
I feel this is nonsense. Ontology is not independent from logic. I rather hold that a particular 
logic is by definition the expression of a particular ontology. So, what did Russell start from to 
arrive at his logic (even though he didn't admit this 'order' himself)? 
The world consists of a number, perhaps finite, perhaps infinite, of entities which have 
various relations to each other, and perhaps also various qualities. 
At the time of writing the essay 'Logical Atomism,' which was after his major works in logic 
early in the twentieth century, he was strongly influenced by the then recent formulation of 
relativity theory in physics. Russell therefore continues to describe his ontology as follows: 
Each of these entities may be called an "event"[. ...] Every event has to a certain 
number of others a relation which may be called "compresence"[.] 
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What, now, may be concluded for logical atomism? For the purpose of this paper I would 
characterize it as a doctrine which argues for, say, information atoms. More information, by 
definition composite or derivative in nature, may be constructed from such atoms. The 
information atoms correspond to 'real' atoms. And through extended correspondence, 
information constructs are also believed to represent 'real' constructs. 
Let me just check my interpretation of Russell's concept against accepted wisdom on logical 
atomism. I find my criticism of Russell's priorities confirmed by A. Oliver (2000): 
The name 'logical atomism' refers to a network of theses about the parts and the 
structure of the world and the means by which language represents the world. 
Oliver continues his description of logical atomism as follows: 
[T]he meaning of our sentences is rooted in a primitive relation between simple 
expressions and their simple worldly bearers, the logical atoms. In a logically perfect 
language, atomic sentences describe configurations of these atoms, and complex 
sentences are combinations of the atomic sentences. [... T]here are differences in the 
nature of logical atoms and in the arguments for the existence of these atoms. 
B. Wolniewicz (1991) presents logical atomism as 
a metaphysical doctrine to the effect that the world consists of 'logical atoms', i.e. of 
elements or parts such that none entails the presence of the other. 
What is lost here is the distinction between reality and language/logic. It seems Wolniewicz is 
referring to reality, only. 
Thus logical atoms are marked by their mutual independence or separability, not [...] 
by their indivisibility. 
Though Wolniewicz might be confusing 'real' atoms with logical atoms, his emphasis on "their 
mutual independence or separability" is characteristic for logical atomism throughout. 
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3. Representatives 
What does all this have to do with Kent and Data and Reality? I believe Kent attempts to fight 
what I here take the liberty of calling modeling myopia. 
People in the data processing community have gotten used to viewing things in a highly 
simplistic way, dictated by the kind of tools they have at their disposal. [p xxii] 
About a quarter of a century after he first published these words, how "things" are viewed in 
information management hasn't really changed. Despite efforts at emphasizing conceptual 
modeling, information management generally continues to suffer from a strong technological 
bias. Regretfully, Kent's question 
How badly oversimplified is the view of information in currently used data models?[p 
xx] 
is therefore equally relevant today. Kent wants to remain realistic, though. So, he keeps his 
suggestions for conceptual modeling well within the possibilities of the information technology 
of his days (only devoting the final chapter of his book to more fundamental conceptual 
innovation). He is after all writing for an audience of practitioners. Anyway, it is only by 
assuming such enlightened conservatism on Kent's part that he makes sense with the following 
constraint. 
The problem is that we would like the representatives of two things to somehow be 
cleanly disjoint, to be distinctly separate from each other.[p 42] 
Essentially, he restates the axioms for logical atomism. What distinguishes Kent from, for 
example, Russell is that he realizes the constraint exemplifies a sacrifice in the quality of 
modeling. For, 
[u]nfortunately, much of the data about something concerns its relationships to other 
things, and therefore comprises data about those other things as well. [... W]e can't 
draw an imaginary circle around a body of information and say that it contains 
everything we know about a certain thing, and everything in the circle pertains only to 
that thing, and hence the information "represents" the thing.[p 43] 
Of all people, Kent is most likely trying to convince especially himself where he writes that 
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[e]ven if we could, the concept is just too "smeared" — we need some kind of focal point 
to which we can figuratively point and say "this is the representative of that thing".[p 
43] 
And laying additional stress on lost opportunities, Kent repeats: 
We won't try to solve this problem. We will simply skirt the whole issue and continue to 
use the term "representative".[p 43] 
Or, more specifically: 
In making types non-exclusive, we come closer to reality — and suffer the penalty of 
facing more of the complexities of real life. [...] But saying that this is a disadvantage is 
the view of the ostrich. Exclusive sets don't solve the problem; they avoid it[. p 112] 
 
4. From information systems to web services 
I continue to recognize in Data and Reality demonstrations of Kent's awareness of how 
general application of — what I, for discussion's sake, have introduced here as — logical 
atomism limits conceptual modeling and ensuing practical information management. He enlists 
the concept of information system in order to define only a local effect for the atomic 
constraint. 
A representative is intended to represent one thing in the real world, and that real thing 
should have only one representative in an information system. [...] Something in the 
real world may have several representatives in several information systems, but should 
have no more than one representative in each.[pp 43-44] 
This neatly fits the idea expressed in the opening sentence of Data and Reality which reads: 
An information system (e.g., database) is a model of a small, finite subset of the 
world.[p 1] 
How I interpret Kent in retrospect is that he focuses on database technology, current and/or 
under development in 1978, to ground a concept of something like a multitude of localized 
representatives of "one thing in the real world," with such representatives distributed over 
separate databases annex information systems. However, even admitting continued dominance 
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of a technological bias, much has changed in the meantime. The separate database, or 
information system, is no longer the paradigmatic concept. A radical shift is underway from 
closed control to open interconnection. At least for the near future, the so-called web service 
has become paradigmatic. From the perspective of logical atomism there is actually much irony 
in such developments. For the traditional information system is readily deconstructed. The new 
atoms are the web services. But precisely the web services concept undermines the database 
concept as the mechanism for localizing one thing's representatives. For a single web service 
may need to process different representatives of one thing. This requires a conceptually 
grounded mechanism for differentiation between representatives, rather than relying on 
different databases. The latter keep representatives merely technically separate. 
Again, Kent already recognizes major issues even though he continues from his orientation at 
databases/information systems. For example, 
when files get integrated into a database serving multiple applications, that ambiguity-
resolving mechanism is lost. The assumptions appropriate to the context of one 
application may not fit the contexts of other applications.[p 3] 
Kent is of course referring to the stage before the availability of integrated databases, i.e., the 
stage of data maintained in separate files. The shift from information system to web service can 
now be recognized as compounding the requirements for conceptual modeling occurring from 
that earlier shift, that is, the one from file to database. However, I also want to illustrate why 
Kent continues to offer his suggestions from the perspective of database-constrained 
representatives of "one thing." 
The various people and applications using a database are likely to have different 
perceptions of the entities and information they are dealing with [...] Different 
applications use different facts about entities[. ...] Thus there is a level of description 
corresponding to the perceptions and expectations of various applications[. p 27] 
The integrated database is the system's analog to the real world: it is that ongoing 
persistent thing of which different applications may have different perceptions.[p 28] 
[The conceptual model] reflects a perception of reality held by one person or group, in 
the role of the database administrator. [...] Although it is a single perception of reality, 
it must be broad and universal enough to be transformable into the perceptions of all 
the applications supported by the database.[p 31] 
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The concept of application, as 'applied' by Kent, still comes out as part of a framework for 
closed control. The suggestion seems that the number of applications accessing a particular 
database remains within controllable limits. The conceptual variety of "one thing" is therefore 
also believed to stay limited; a "database administrator" is sufficient for design and supervision. 
All such assumptions are undermined when boundaries dissolve. They were once effectively 
held up by separate databases. Web services don't prosper in an environment with conceptual 
boundaries implied by the technical boundaries between databases. The World Wide Web 
Consortium's slogan of the semantic web was designed to promote open interconnectivity 
through web services, replacing closed control from a separate database. 
Closely related to efforts for tooling the semantic web is an interest in ontologies. It seems, 
however, that members of the information technology community are often unaware of the — 
tradition of the — philosophical concept of ontology. For example, Fensel (2001) writes: 
Ontologies are developed to provide a machine-processable semantics of information 
sources that can be communicated between different agents (software and humans). 
He adds that 
[m]any definitions of ontologies have been given in the last decade[.] 
In a philosophical sense, ontology surely is a somewhat older concept. And that is putting it 
mildly. The philosophical concept should equally serve development of the "semantic web," 
though. But, then, Fensel is not only short-sighted. As the statements quoted above 
demonstrate, he is also confused about ontology as a type and as an instance, respectively. Kent 
is only one among many authors who warns against such confusion: 
As usual, we have to be careful to avoid the confusion between kinds and instances.[p 
73] 
 
5. Ontological atom: from object to behavior 
Elsewhere, I have at length explained my conceptual modeling suggestions for open 
interconnectivity (see, for example, Wisse 1999, 2001/a, 2001/b, 2002). Here, I will continue 
the discussion from the perspective of logical atomism. When it so clearly fails as a paradigm 
to support variety in conceptual modeling, what precisely needs to be improved? Can I present 
my own work on conceptual modeling principles in this light? 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-3
The ontological atom of behavior 
 
 13
In a host of ontologies, the concept of thing — or entity, or object — may be recognized to 
constitute what I propose to label the ontological atom. Despite his reservations, for his concept 
of representative Kent, too, orients himself at "things." His expectation of inevitable 
shortcomings show through in statements such as these:  
This classification problem underlies the general ambiguity of words. The set of 
concepts we try to communicate about is infinite (and non-denumerable in the most 
mind-boggling sense), whereas we communicate using an essentially finite set of 
words.[p 7] 
There is no natural set of categories. The set of categories to be maintained in an 
information system must be specified for that system. [...] A given thing (representative) 
might belong to many such categories. Not only are there different kinds of categories, 
but categories may be defined at different levels of refinement.[p 15] 
As I have already quoted from Kent (1978, p 43), above, he "simply skirt[s] the whole issue" of 
thing as an inadequate ontological atom. It is precisely this issue that needs to be resolved. If 
not, contradictions continue to arise in conceptual modeling and subsequently in everything that 
depends on a conceptual model. 
What led me to deconstruct 'object' as the ontological atom was the insight that one and the 
same thing may nevertheless exhibit different behaviors. This makes 'behavior' the ontological 
atom. 
Concepts of object and behavior are still insufficient for an unambiguous ontology. For the 
question remains what determines how an object favors one behavior over other behaviors it is 
potentially capable of. The answer lies in a third concept: situation. Atomic behavior 
corresponds to a situationally determined 'part' of an object. Again, the object is no longer 
atomic. Its behaviors are now atomized. 
In several publications (see bibliography, below), I've attempted to optimize the conceptual 
economy of such an ontology by declaring situation, object and behavior all relative concepts. 
A particular situational object, i.e., that part of an object that is associated with a particular 
behavior, provides the perspective. From that perspective, behavior is constituted by objects in 
the sense of an explosion function. In the opposite direction, situation is a recursive function of 
objects. 
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Jumping from object to behavior as the ontological atom might appear counterintuitive. The 
gain is the ambiguity absorbed by the concept of behavior. It resolves the paradox inherent in 
the assumption of a privileged thing-word complex. For in one sense, behavior is an object, too. 
But in another sense, it deconstructs an object. Behavior undermines the object's absolute 
existence. It challenges inseparable identity. The concept of behavior, the concept I offer for it, 
anyway, dictates that an object only exists through situations. 
Similar ontological constructs might of course have been arrived at using terminology such as 
Kent applies. Radical as they already are, his suggestions stop at ordering several previously 
distinct concepts under a single denominator. Not surprisingly, they are all subordinated to 
Kent's ontological atom, i.e., to thing or, as he already calls it especially in his last chapter, 
object. I have selected some expressions for his unifying proposals. 
Relationships are the stuff of which information is made. Just about everything in the 
information system looks like a relationship.[p 73] 
A relationship is an association among several things, with that association having a 
particular significance.[p 73] 
Instances of relationships are things themselves, about which we may have information 
in the system.[p 85] 
I can't tell the difference between attributes and relationships. [... ] There really does 
always seem to be an entity lurking behind the scenes somewhere[. pp 91-92] 
We start [...] from a unifying premise: all [...] constructs are in fact entities. Each 
phenomen[on], and each of [its] instances, is a distinct integral concept, capable of 
being represented as a unit item in a model.[p 192] 
Everything in the repository is an "object". The term is used interchangeably with 
"surrogate", representative", and sometimes "thing".[p 193] 
Too many of the graphical models make entities and relationships mutually exclusive by 
forcing entities to be points (nodes) and the relationships to be lines (edges). Then you 
are not permitted to draw a line between two lines, or from a line to a point. What we 
have done, if you must picture it, is to give each line a bulge in its middle, so that it can 
itself function as a node.[p 209] 
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No matter how consistently object is applied as the ontological atom, it simply never succeeds 
in offering support for conceptually modeling behavioral diversity. A more finely-grained 
ontological atom is required. Its label is of course already suggested by the previous sentence: 
behavior. This concept retains object-like characteristics while fragmenting an object into 
situational parts. However, even though behavior is now the essential concept it constitutes an 
ontological atom nonetheless. The metapattern is therefore a variant of logical atomism, too. I 
repeat that the metapattern — sketched here in terms of logical atomism — is documented in 
detail elsewhere. 
 
6. On interests 
It is not only along the dimension of what to objectively consider a "thing" that Kent indicates 
constraints for conceptual modeling. He also appears keenly aware of, let me call it here, the 
subjective side of information. Yet, again, he merely observes. He doesn't proceed with 
proposals for — a method of — conceptual modeling. I believe I did (Wisse 2002). In 
retrospect, here I take Kent's observations as perceptive problem statements. He writes, for 
example: 
The purposes of the person using an object very often determine what that object is 
perceived to be.[p 17] 
Kent's qualifying formulation might very well reflect his intention of not dealing with the issue 
of subjective purposes or, as I call them, interests. By writing that interests "very often 
determine" perception he leaves it open that, in other cases, they don't. This way, he should be 
licensed to refrain from the issue of subjectivity in conceptual modeling. 
I believe that subjectivity's import ultimately has to be radically faced (Wisse 2002) for 
productive modeling. For I take it that subjective interests always determine perception, 
etcetera. As I also assume that only an individual person, or subject, holds interests, the 
expression 'subjective interests' is actually a pleonasm. 
Isn't it prohibitively difficult to include the perspective of interests in a framework for 
conceptual modeling? It all depends on the ontological atom. I would say it is even impossible 
starting from the concept of object. However, the shift to behavior as the ontological atom 
suddenly makes it obvious. For a particular — always subjective — perception is an instance of 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/2-3
The ontological atom of behavior 
 
 16
behavior, too. This makes the interest from which it 'originates' the corresponding situation. 
Especially chapters 7 and 8 in Wisse (2002) present an interest-grounded view of information. 
Here, I further remark that the shift from object to behavior as the ontological atom seems to 
capture Wittgenstein's philosophical transition. It is what I can now call their object-oriented 
logical atomism that Russell and the younger Wittgenstein (1921) to a large extent shared. The 
older Wittgenstein (1953) considered meaning no longer as objective, but as residing in 
language use. In my scheme, his concept of language game simply amounts to a situation, too. 
For illustrating the limits of an 'objectivist' logical atomism I've again collected some phrases 
from Data and Reality. These especially show Kent's appreciation of how subjective 
information 'really' is. 
We are dealing with a natural ambiguity of words, which we as human beings resolve in 
a largely automatic and unconscious way, because we understand the context in which 
the words are being used.[p 3] 
Thus, the boundaries and extent of "one thing" can be very arbitrarily established. This 
is even more so when we perform "classification" in an area that has no natural sharp 
boundaries at all. The set of things that human beings know how to do is infinitely 
varied, and changes from one human being to another in the most subtle and devious 
ways.[p 6] 
Almost all non-trivial categories have fuzzy boundaries. That is, we can usually think of 
some object whose membership in the category is debatable. Then either the object is 
arbitrarily categorized by some individual, or else there are some locally defined 
classification rules which probably don't match the rules used in another information 
system.[p 17] 
If we really did want to define what a database modeled, we'd have to start thinking in 
terms of mental reality rather than physical reality. Most things are in the database 
because they "exist" in people's minds, without having any "objective" existence. (Which 
means we very much have to deal with their existing differently in different people's 
minds.)[p 20] 
[W]e are not modeling reality, but the way information about reality is processed, by 
people.[p 22] 
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We mustn't neglect the plain and familiar ambiguities, which make their own large 
contribution to our communication confusion. Most words simply do have multiple 
meanings; we can't escape that.[p 66] 
Reading these phrases, the question returns why Kent didn't proceed to include provisions for 
subjectivist diversity in his approach to conceptual modeling. I can only repeat that his obstacle, 
and no doubt of countless others, was a logical atomism at an unproductive level of ontological 
atom, i.e., still formally object-oriented. The failure to address the ontological issue explicitly, 
and with necessary and sufficient rigor, seems to have obstructed a fundamental shift. Kent, for 
one, apparently thought it a realistic necessity to accept constraints. 
Information in its "real" essence is probably too amorphous, too ambiguous, too 
subjective, too slippery and elusive, to ever be pinned down precisely by the objective 
and deterministic processes embodied in a computer.[p xx] 
It is customary that you, the user, know what the fields signify. The manner in which a 
multiplicity of users get to know, and agree about, what these data items mean is the 
central point of data description.[p 36] 
I must accept paradoxes embedded right in [my philosophy of reality. ...] I am 
convinced, at bottom, that no two people have a perception of reality that is identical in 
every detail. In fact, a given person has different views at different times[. ...] But for 
the purposes of survival and the conduct of our daily lives (relatively narrow purposes), 
chances of reconciliation [of views] are necessarily high. [...] High enough to make the 
systems workably acceptable[. pp 227-228] 
In an absolute sense, there is no singular objective reality. But we can share a common 
enough view of it for most of our working purposes, so that reality does appear to be 
objective and stable.[p 228] 
Kent concludes his book appealing that conceptual modeling needs to be — further — revised 
and improved for supporting variety. 
[T]he chances of achieving [...] a shared view become poorer when we try to 
encompass broader purposes, and to involve more people. This is precisely why the 
question is becoming more relevant today: the thrust of technology is to foster 
interaction among greater numbers of people, and to integrate processes into monoliths 
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serving wider and wider purposes. It is in this environment that discrepancies in 
fundamental assumptions will become increasingly exposed.[p 229] 
 
7. Final remarks 
Indeed, the critical issue is to resolve "discrepancies in fundamental assumptions." There will 
actually always be such discrepancies. For the "thrust of technology" can be relied on to create 
problems as a result of solutions, and so on. There's nothing pessimistic about this. It's just a 
realistic interpretation of the Law of Requisite Variety (Ashby 1956). 
What Kent has put his finger on is only now starting to be addressed fundamentally. For me, 
reading Data and Reality has been an inspiring exercise. I take his classic analysis of 
shortcomings in conceptual modeling as confirmation that an ontology such as subjective 
situationism (Wisse 2002) is required for handling variety in information management. In this 
paper, I have laid the foundation for regarding subjective situationism as a behavior-oriented 
logical atomism. It is therefore a logic, too. 
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